What the Diesel Deal Revealed
In October 2026, the Trump administration did something that contradicted its own sanctions policy. It suspended sanctions on Russian diesel and permitted imports from Moscow. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control issued General License 135, authorizing transactions involving Russian diesel until April 7, 2027. Trump announced the scale: over 300,000 tonnes immediately, with up to 3 million tonnes to follow.
The official explanation was domestic diesel prices, which sat at $6.28 a gallon, down slightly from a record $6.53 in late September. That explanation does not survive contact with the facts. Just weeks earlier, Congress passed the Lindsey O. Graham Sanctioning Russia and Iran Act, authorizing tariffs of up to 100% on countries buying Russian oil and gas.
A country sanctioning Russian energy exports was simultaneously buying Russian energy. That is not a policy contradiction. It is a statement of priorities. When domestic politics demand it, the sanctions architecture bends.
The Nuclear Exemption Is Already Law
The Graham bill contained a nuclear exception. It authorized punitive tariffs on Russian oil buyers while exempting civilian nuclear cooperation activities and specified imports of low-enriched uranium.
That design was not accidental. In 2025, Russia supplied 26% of the enrichment services purchased by U.S. civilian reactor operators, roughly 3.28 million separative work units. That made it the single largest foreign source of enrichment for the American fleet. U.S.-origin supply accounted for 23%.
The House passed the bill 262-159. The Senate passed it 86-11. Lawmakers in both parties understood the distinction. Being tough on Russian oil is one thing. Being tough on the fuel that keeps American reactors running is another.
The 2028 Deadline and the Reality Behind It
The 2024 Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act established a waiver mechanism scheduled to end on January 1, 2028. The deadline exists because domestic capacity was supposed to be online by then.
Domestic capacity will not be online by then. Urenco’s New Mexico facility is currently the only commercial-scale enrichment plant in the United States, with a capacity of 4.3 million separative work units per year, enough to cover roughly one-third of U.S. enrichment demand. Its expansion is scheduled to begin construction in 2029, with the first centrifuges producing in 2032 and full capacity in 2036. Orano’s French expansion will not produce until 2028 and will not reach full capacity until 2030. No domestic producer is expected to reach commercial output before 2030.
A Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory assessment estimates the United States will need roughly 1,977 metric tons of low-enriched uranium in 2028. Production from the Urenco New Mexico plant is projected at 600 to 695 metric tons.
The Depth of the Dependency
The U.S. nuclear industry’s reliance on Russian enrichment capacity is the product of decades of structural choices. The Megatons to Megawatts program, which ran from 1995 to 2013, converted roughly 500 tonnes of Russian weapons-grade uranium into reactor fuel and supplied up to 10% of American electricity. That arrangement also discouraged long-term investment in domestic enrichment capacity. The last U.S.-owned enrichment facility closed as the program wound down.
Today, four companies dominate the global enrichment market. Rosatom holds 43%, Urenco 25%, CNNC 20%, and Orano 11%. Russia’s share exceeds any single alternative.
In 2025, Rosatom’s enrichment services to U.S. nuclear plants were worth approximately $1 billion, roughly 70% higher than the pre-war annual average. For the United States, that is not merely a commercial transaction. It is a geopolitical vulnerability. For Moscow, the revenue is less important than the leverage.
Advanced Reactors Deepen the Problem
The United States is simultaneously accelerating advanced reactor deployment, with a stated goal of quadrupling nuclear capacity by 2050. Four test reactors reached criticality by July 2026, the first privately developed non-light-water reactors to do so in 40 years.
Many of those designs require HALEU, a fuel type where Russia is currently the only commercial-scale supplier. Urenco plans to produce 10 metric tons of HALEU per year in the United Kingdom, but not until the early 2030s. The Department of Energy’s $2.7 billion HALEU procurement program exists precisely because the fuel is not yet available.
What an Unpredictable Customer Means
The diesel deal operates on the same logic as nuclear fuel. When the United States needs something, sanctions bend.
Seven senators, four Republicans and three Democrats, called the diesel deal a violation of U.S. law and urged Trump to reverse course. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky called it an investment in a war that must be ended. None of that changed the outcome. The deal proceeded.
Nuclear fuel is a deeper dependency than diesel. Diesel can be sourced from dozens of countries. Enrichment capacity is concentrated among four suppliers globally. If diesel triggered a sanctions suspension within weeks, uranium will trigger a waiver extension in 2028. Congress can extend it with a one-line amendment.
For any company engaging with the U.S. nuclear market, this creates a fundamental risk. Policy is variable. Demand is constant. Washington will commit to energy independence in public and maintain reactor operations in practice. When the deadline arrives and replacement supply does not exist, it will choose the reactors over the principle.
That is not a criticism of the United States. It is an observation about the market. A government willing to reverse its position on diesel within weeks will reverse its position on uranium within years. Investors and suppliers should price accordingly.
